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ABSTRACT 
 
Geofencing technology enables companies to obtain users’ physical location and 
deliver customized communications, including political messages. But to 
accomplish this, some businesses transmit user data to third parties without consent. 
The privacy tort of intrusion and Federal Trade Commission actions target unfair 
or deceptive practices, but these avenues are inadequate. Users’ privacy should be 
safeguarded by creating a federal privacy statute that requires opt-in notification 
and periodic reminders of data collection, usage, and transmission practices. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Pregnancy Help.” 
“You Have Choices.” 
“You’re Not Alone.” 
In 2015 and 2016, young women in or near various medical facilities 
(including reproductive health clinics and methadone clinics) in five states received 
messages like these on their smartphones.2 The messages ostensibly were designed 
to discourage “abortion-minded women”3 from terminating pregnancies at the 
clinics. But the messages weren’t invited, and they weren’t welcome. They were 
thrust upon the smartphone users by a company called Copley Advertising. To 
accomplish this feat, Copley used a technology called geofencing. 
Geofencing is a location-based tool targeting users of internet-enabled 
devices, such as smartphones, in a predefined area. Through Global Positioning 
                                                          
2 These facilities were located in New York City; Columbus, Ohio; Richmond, Virginia; St. Louis, 
Missouri; and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Assurance of Discontinuance Pursuant to G.L. 93A, §5, 
In re Copley Advertising, LLC (Apr. 4, 2017) [hereinafter Assurance of Discontinuance], at 3. 
3 AG Reaches Settlement with Advertising Company Prohibiting “Geofencing” Around 
Massachusetts Healthcare Facilities (Apr. 4, 2017), http://www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-
updates/press-releases/2017/2017-04-04-copley-advertising-geofencing.html. 
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System (GPS) coordinates, individuals or companies can define geographic 
perimeters and build virtual fences (called “geofences”) around these areas.4 
Identifying information from the users’ smartphones—such as GPS information or 
wireless Internet access information5—can then be used to target users within, or 
exclude them from, that virtual boundary.6 
Often, this technology is relatively benign. For example, the retail company 
Target uses geofencing technology to push advertisements to prospective shoppers 
within a certain radius of Target stores.7 When potential customers enter that 
predefined radius, they receive messages regarding various deals at Target. To 
obtain these notifications, though, users must have the Target mobile application 
installed, have Bluetooth turned on, and opt in to receive these messages.8 Because 
these users elect to receive such advertising, and can stop receiving the messages 
at will by disabling or removing the app or turning off Bluetooth, this use of 
geofencing technology typically poses few legal or ethical concerns—assuming 
that the users have been properly notified of how their data is being used.9 
Copley’s practices were detailed in an Assurance of Discontinuance 
(“Assurance”) entered into between Copley and the Attorney General of 
Massachusetts in April 2017.10 According to the Assurance, Copley’s use of 
geofencing technology was arguably more nefarious because it identified, or 
“tagged,” users’ smartphones and caused third-party advertisements to display on 
mobile applications for up to 30 days. When users clicked on the messages, a 
webpage opened with abortion alternatives and access to a live “pregnancy support 
                                                          
4 Thomas C. Gallagher, The Virtual Bathroom Stall: Solving the Headache of Geo-Based 
Anonymous Message Applications, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 922, 935 (2017); Diana Graber, Yik 
Yak App Makers Do the Right Thing, HUFFINGTON POST: BLOG (Mar. 26, 2014, 6:10 PM ET), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/diana-graber/yik-yak-app-makers-do-the_b_5029679.html.   
5 The information transmitted by the smartphone that can be used to determine whether a user has 
entered or exited the designated area includes “latitude, longitude, GPS (Global Positioning 
System) information, IP (internet protocol) address, wireless Internet access information, so-called 
Bluetooth technology, Near-Field Communication (“NFC”) information, or device identification 
information.” Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 1, at 2. 
6 Graber, supra note 4.   
7 Sarah Perez, Target Launches Beacon Test in 50 Stores, Will Expand Nationwide Later This 
Year, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 5, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/08/05/target-launches-beacon-
test-in-50-stores-with-expanded-rollout-later-this-year/. 
8 Id. See generally Sophia Martin Schechner, Beacon Technology and the Future/Present State of 
E-Commerce Retail Sales, 26 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 172, 178-179 (2016) (explaining how 
retailers use Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) beacon technology to reach consumers within 
predefined virtual borders). 
9 Schechner, supra note 8, at 181. 
10 Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 2, at 1. 
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specialist.”11 Copley’s sole employee, John Flynn, asserted that Copley could “set 
up a mobile geofence around an area—Planned Parenthood clinic[s], hospitals, 
[and] doctor’s offices that perform abortions.”12 In fact, Flynn claimed that Copley 
could “tag all the smartphones entering and leaving the nearly 700 Planned 
Parenthood clinics in the U.S.”13 On Twitter, Flynn further noted that “Copley’s 
advertising can drill down to age and gender.”14 
For example, Copley contracted with two companies: Bethany Christian 
Services, which provides pregnancy counseling, and RealOptions, which has 
California-based crisis pregnancy centers. Copley determined the geolocation of 
users near various medical facilities and disclosed that information to Bethany and 
RealOptions so the third parties’ messages could be delivered to the targeted users. 
Users who received the messages were unaware that Copley had tagged their 
devices or disclosed their geolocation.15 
The Assurance of Discontinuance states that after learning of Copley’s 
practices in other states, Massachusetts Attorney General Maura Healey proactively 
sought to characterize them as “unfair or deceptive” under the Massachusetts 
Consumer Protection Act. Specifically, Healey said Copley’s practices “intrude[ ] 
upon a consumer’s private health or medical affairs or status and/or result[ ] in the 
gathering or dissemination of private health or medical facts about the consumer 
without his or her knowledge or consent.”16 Although admitting no fault in the 
Assurance, Copley promised to abstain from geofencing within “the Vicinity of any 
Medical Center located in the state of Massachusetts to infer the health status, 
medical condition, or medical treatment of any person.”17 
The Assurance raises some questions, however. First, Copley claimed its 
First Amendment rights were violated because corporate political speech is 
protected by the First Amendment. And second, Copley argued that its “right to 
free speech should not be marginalized because government officials do not agree 
with the message of their advertisement.”18 If Healey, in fact, censured Copley 
based on its message content, then Copley’s argument has weight. To add fuel to 
                                                          
11 Id. at 2-4. 
12 Id. at 3. 
13 Id. at 4. 
14 Curt Woodward & Hiawatha Bray, A Company Sent Anti-Abortion Ads by Phone. 
Massachusetts Wasn’t Having It., BOSTON GLOBE (Apr. 4, 2017), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2017/04/04/healey-halts-digital-ads-targeted-women-
reproductive- clinics/AoyPUG8u9hq9bJUAKC5gZN/story.html. 
15 Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 2, at 3-4. 
16 Id. at 4-5. 
17 Id. at 7. 
18 Woodward & Bray, supra note 14. 
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this argument, numerous other companies use geofencing technology without 
attracting the attention of the Attorney General of Massachusetts. 
This study explores the relationship between the First Amendment and 
regulating the use of geofencing technology to deliver targeted messages. The paper 
poses three questions: (1) can Copley’s practices be curbed consistent with the First 
Amendment; (2) to what extent, if any, do Copley’s practices violate individuals’ 
privacy expectations; and (3) what would reasonable restrictions on the use of 
geofencing technology include? 
To analyze these questions, this study employed traditional legal research 
methodology. A Westlaw search identified relevant law review articles for 
background information. Additionally, a Westlaw search for all federal and state 
cases involving the terms “geolocation” or geofencing” yielded 408 cases, which 
were filtered to exclude criminal cases (involving governmental use of geolocation 
technologies for surveillance purposes) and cases unrelated to privacy. The 
remaining 315 cases—mostly from the Northern District of California—were 
analyzed to determine how courts have viewed the privacy implications of 
electronic data collection and use, including geolocation technology. Finally, this 
paper also analyzed Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) reports to inform the 
analysis of the FTC’s guiding principles regarding geolocation technology. 
I. CORPORATE POLITICAL SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Copley’s speech has been characterized as “quite crass behavior” and even 
“predatory.”19 Yet Copley claimed Healey unfairly targeted the content of its speech 
in violation of the First Amendment.20 This section argues that in light of Supreme 
Court decisions on abortion-related speech, Healey’s actions in censuring Copley 
could be read as consistent with First Amendment principles. The key here is that 
if Healey’s actions focused not on the content of Copley’s speech, but on the 
“predatory” nature of Copley’s practices—particularly the unauthorized use of 
geofencing technology to obtain and share users’ sensitive information with third 
parties—then Healey’s actions would pass muster. However, if Healey were to have 
targeted Copley based on the content or “crassness” of Copley’s messages, this 
would violate the First Amendment. 
Corporate political speech—which includes even crass corporate speech—
is strongly protected under the First Amendment. In Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment protects 
                                                          
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
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the core political speech of companies just as strongly as it does for individuals.21 
Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation, successfully argued in that case that 
corporations have a First Amendment-protected right to finance speech that 
expressly advocates the election or defeat of a candidate for federal office.22 Until 
Citizens United, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”) 
prohibited corporations from exercising their political voice in this manner.23 
However, in invalidating the BCRA’s ban on corporate expenditures, the Court 
affirmed that First Amendment speech rights extend not just to individuals but to 
corporate entities.24 Although Citizens United did not equate corporations with 
people, it did signal that speech will be treated equally, whether it comes from a 
corporation or a person. Perhaps the clearest pronouncement of the Court’s 
intentions can be found in Justice Kennedy’s Citizens United opinion, which stated, 
“[P]olitical speech does not lose First Amendment protection ‘simply because its 
source is a corporation.’”25  
The principle that political speech should be afforded the strongest 
protections has been stated numerous times by the Supreme Court.26 For example, 
in Buckley v. Valeo, the Court said: 
 
Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of 
candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government 
established by our Constitution. The First Amendment affords the 
broadest protection to such political expression in order ‘to assure 
                                                          
21 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 364 (2010). 
22 See Id. In January 2008, Citizens United released Hillary: The Movie, a documentary critical of 
Hillary Clinton, in theaters and DVD. Citizens United, however, wanted to broaden its reach by 
making the documentary available through video-on-demand in the 30-day window before the 
primary election. Id. at 320-21. Under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, corporations 
could not use general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for any “electioneering 
communication.” 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2005). Citizens United brought an action against the Federal 
Election Commission for declaratory and injunctive relief, asserting that the BCRA’s ban on 
corporate-funded independent expenditures was unconstitutional. Citizens United v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n. 558 U.S. at 321. 
23 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 320. The Citizens United Court overturned two cases that regulated 
these corporate expenditures: Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), and 
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
24 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 364 (2010). 
25 Id. at 342 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978)). 
26 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25, 44-45 (1976); R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422 
(1992) (stating that “[c]ore political speech occupies the highest, most protected position; 
commercial speech and nonobscene, sexually explicit speech are regarded as a sort of second-class 
expression; obscenity and fighting words receive the least protection of all”). 
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(the) unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of 
political and social changes desired by the people.’27 
 
Protecting the robust discussion of political issues is central to the First 
Amendment. Therefore, using consumer protection laws to stifle or silence political 
discourse should, as one scholar said, “give people pause.”28 
Despite the limitations implied by its name, “core political speech” is not 
reserved for speaking out about candidates running for office in governmental 
elections.29 It encompasses a diverse array of activities, from speech about income 
tax referendums to the anonymous distribution of leaflets about a ballot issue.30 In 
this vein, abortion-related speech has been characterized as political. Thus, the 
Supreme Court has on multiple occasions protected the rights of protestors who 
gather near abortion clinics.31 Copley’s speech is also not just commercial, but 
political, and should realize the same heightened First Amendment protections.32 
Content-based regulations aimed at curbing Copley’s speech would therefore be 
subject to strict scrutiny. 
Even if Copley’s speech is political, though, the analysis would not cease 
here. The question would morph into whether Copley’s speech could (or should) 
still be regulated consistent with First Amendment principles. Supreme Court 
decisions on abortion-related speech, particularly with respect to reasonable buffer 
zones, provide an avenue to curb Copley’s practices without stifling corporate 
speech rights. 
In Hill v. Colorado, the Supreme Court found constitutional a Colorado 
statute requiring a 100-foot buffer around abortion clinics, designed to protect 
women from “sidewalk counseling,” including “efforts ‘to educate, counsel, 
persuade, or inform passersby about abortion and abortion alternatives by means of 
verbal or written speech.’”33 The Hill Court was particularly concerned about 
protecting women from “strong and abusive language in face-to-face encounters.”34 
The Court focused on the behaviors targeted by the statute: “the harassment, the 
nuisance, the persistent importuning, the following, the dogging, and the implied 
                                                          
27 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14. 
28 Woodward, supra note 14, at 4. 
29 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995). 
30 First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978); McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347. 
31 See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2537 (2014); Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 
512 U.S. 753, 776 (1994). 
32 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010); R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 
422 (1992). 
33 Hill v. Colorado, 503 U.S. 703, 708 (2000). 
34 Id. at 710. 
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thread of physical touching.”35 The Colorado statute did not target a particular 
viewpoint; it just “establishe[d] a minor place restriction on an extremely broad 
category of communications with unwilling listeners.”36 Similarly, it would be 
possible to craft a law regulating Copley’s nefarious behavior—the use of 
geofencing technology to target vulnerable women without obtaining user 
permission in advance. 
On the other side of the coin, in Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc.,37 
the Supreme Court considered an injunction that curbed speech by pro-life 
protesters. The injunction included a 36-foot buffer around an abortion clinic as 
well as other provisions including a ban on all “images observable” from the clinic, 
and a restriction on approaching women within 300 feet of the clinic.38 The 36-
foot buffer zone was upheld because it was a simple content-neutral time, place, or 
manner restriction that facilitated entering and exiting the clinic and shielded the 
clinic from overly loud speech.39 But the other three restrictions unconstitutionally 
burdened speech. Patients who were made uncomfortable by the “images 
observable” from within the clinic could easily shield themselves from the images 
by engaging in simple behaviors such as closing their curtains.40 The 300-foot ban 
on picketing was similarly overbroad: 
 
[I]t is difficult, indeed, to justify a prohibition on all uninvited 
approaches of persons seeking the services of the clinic, regardless 
of how peaceful the contact may be, without burdening more speech 
than necessary to prevent intimidation and to ensure access to the 
clinic.41 
 
Central to Madsen is the idea that individuals should be protected from harassment 
and threats while alternatives that support speech should be provided. 
Although Hill and Madsen initially seem at odds, when evaluated in light 
of Copley’s behavior, they are, in fact, consistent. Together, they stand for the 
proposition that speech can be reasonably restricted. The restrictions, however, 
must be neutral and not burden more speech than necessary. Under this umbrella is 
                                                          
35 Id. at 724. 
36 Id. at 723. 
37 Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 754 (1994). 
38 Id. at 759-61. 
39 Id. at 769. 
40 Id. at 773 (stating that this provision violates the First Amendment because “it is much easier for 
the clinic to pull its curtains than for a patient to stop up her ears, and no more is required to avoid 
seeing placards through the windows of a clinic”). 
41 Id. at 774. 
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ample room to regulate the use of geolocation technology. If a restriction neutrally 
targets the unauthorized use of geofencing technology, and does not impose a 
viewpoint restriction on speech, then it could pass constitutional muster. Thus, there 
is room here to regulate Copley’s activities without infringing its First Amendment 
rights. 
Another point to consider here is the Hill Court’s focus on “unwilling 
listeners.”42 This issue is critical because it raises another First Amendment concern 
with respect to Copley’s messaging. Just as people have a First Amendment-
protected right to distribute information, they also have a right to receive it.43 
According to the Court, “Freedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker. But 
where a speaker exists, as is the case here, the protection afforded is to the 
communication, to its source and to its recipients both.”44 The problem here, 
however, is that the Assurance prevents the public from receiving Copley’s political 
messages. Again, though, there is a meaningful distinction between protecting 
one’s right to receive information and penalizing a company’s unauthorized 
commandeering of a smartphone as a tool to deliver that information. The content-
neutral focus on the unauthorized use of technology alleviates the First Amendment 
concerns. 
In the end, Copley’s First Amendment-focused response to the 
Massachusetts action is a bit of a smokescreen. The response focused on Copley’s 
role in delivering (or being a conduit for the delivery of) political speech. But the 
key problem was not the content of Copley’s speech; it was the shady business 
practices Copley used to deliver its message. Copley’s unauthorized collection and 
transmission of user data falls outside the purview of the First Amendment. 
Geolocation data is not “speech.” It “is not collected, used, or sold for its expressive 
content at all; it is a tool for processing people, not a vehicle for injecting 
communication into the ‘marketplace of ideas.’”45 Copley is still free to share 
political messages, but it must comply with strict privacy protection practices that 
safeguard how users’ sensitive information is collected, used, and transmitted. 
 
                                                          
42 Hill, 503 U.S. at 716-719. 
43 Virginia State Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756-757 
(1976) (discussing consumers’ right to receive information about drug prices in the commercial 
speech context); Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (discussing listeners’ 
First Amendment rights). 
44 Virginia State Pharmacy Board. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756 
(1976). 
45 Joseph Tomain, Online Privacy & The First Amendment: An Opt-In Approach to Data 
Processing, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 39-40 (2014). 
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II. THE PRIVACY OF MEDICAL INFORMATION 
Privacy defies simple definition. A few constructions, though, have a more 
expansive reach. Arguably the most common definition was articulated by Samuel 
Warren and Louis Brandeis, who characterized privacy as the “right to be let 
alone.”46 A more detailed version of this definition describes privacy as follows: 
 
The right to privacy is the right to be left alone. It is a fundamental 
and compelling interest. It protects our homes, our families, our 
thoughts, our emotions, our expressions, our personalities, our 
freedom of communication and our freedom to associate with the 
people we choose.47 
 
This definition focuses on autonomy—the right to moderate your behaviors as suits 
you and shield yourself from scrutiny. 
Yet another variation enumerates five “species” of privacy rights folded into 
the definition of a “right to be let alone”: the Warren and Brandeis right grounded 
in unauthorized information collection and use; the First Amendment right to be 
free from others’ speech; the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures; the Fourteenth Amendment right of individual decision-
making; and the broad privacy protections granted by state constitutions.48 
There are countless other examples of scholars attempting to explain what 
privacy is. Although the definitions may be numerous and vague, two common 
threads emerge. The first theme is decisional privacy, or the right to make decisions 
about personal issues such as “marriage, procreation, contraception, family 
relationships, and child rearing and education.”49 The second is informational 
privacy, grounded in the idea that people should be able to shield certain 
information about themselves from the public.50 Copley’s practices involve 
significant informational privacy violations. 
Certain types of information trigger unique privacy concerns. The 
heightened expectation of privacy in medical information can be seen in the 
proliferation of laws like the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
                                                          
46 Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 205 (1890). 
47 Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 7 Cal. 4th 633, 644 (Cal. 1994).  
48 Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335, 1434 (1992). 
49 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-153 (1973) (internal citations omitted); Paul v. Davis 424 U.S. 
693, 714 (1976). 
50 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (recognizing the right to informational privacy, 
but rejecting plaintiffs’ claims that New York statute mandating disclosure of prescription 
information to the state threatened privacy). 
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(“HIPAA”).51 HIPAA’s Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health 
Information, commonly known as the “Privacy Rules,” articulate an individual’s 
right to limit who can obtain and use his/her private medical information.52 Health 
care providers must provide notice of how they use and share private medical data.53 
Users must also give permission before their health records can be shared.54 
Copley’s practices trigger unique informational privacy concerns because 
they accessed and used individuals’ sensitive medical information to deliver 
targeted messages. The users’ physical proximity to certain healthcare providers 
enabled Copley to discern pertinent information about their medical situation. This 
is why users received focused messages outlining abortion alternatives and live-
chat options with pregnancy counselors. As one article noted: 
 
‘[Copley was not] sending them ads for free gasoline or discounts at 
Macy’s[.]’ . . . ‘They were sending them messages that related 
directly to their health and medical status, which, by definition, 
meant that they were improperly accessing somebody’s private 
medical health data in a way that we feel is exploitive.’55 
In other words, Copley was using physical location data to extrapolate sensitive 
medical information which, then, could be used to turn a profit. 
Using geolocation data is an example of “frictionless sharing.” This refers 
to the practice of businesses collecting users’ data automatically without seeking 
permission for each disclosure. This type of sharing is especially appealing to 
businesses because it removes “friction,” which is defined as those “forces which 
prevent individuals from disclosing personal information to online services.”56 The 
less overt a business’s data collection practices are, the less individual friction there 
is. Obviously, this makes it easier for businesses to profit from their consumers. A 
huge problem occurs, however, when “frictionless sharing” includes uniquely 
sensitive information. While companies may characterize unobtrusive data 
collection practices as “frictionless sharing,” these practices render users unable to 
                                                          
51 See generally Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).  
52 45 C.F.R. § 164.500-164.534 (2014); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OCR 
PRIVACY BRIEF: SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE (2003), https://www.hhs.gov/ 
sites/default/files/privacysummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/FN6K-P6HH]. 
53 OCR Privacy Brief, supra note 53, at 11-12. 
54 Id. at 5-6. 
55 Woodward & Bray, supra note 14 (quoting Massachusetts Attorney General Maura Healey). 
56 Schechner, supra note 8, at 180. 
 
JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET • VOLUME 10 • ISSUE 1 • 2019 
Is the Grass Greener on the Other Side of the Geofence? The First Amendment 
and Privacy Implications of Unauthorized Smartphone Messages 
 
11 
engage in fully informed decision-making. The success of “frictionless sharing” is 
firmly grounded in an informational imbalance between businesses and consumers. 
Even if, however, there is a deeply held belief that companies should not 
trade on medical information without first obtaining permission, it is functionally 
difficult to impose strong privacy protections for a couple of reasons.  
First, businesses have come to rely on robust data collection practices. The 
ability to aggregate users’ personal information and derive detailed information 
from that—and as Copley noted, being able to “drill down to age and gender”57—
is immensely valuable “not only to marketers and advertisers but also to insurers, 
lenders and employers.”58 Being able to identify consumers with such specificity 
increases the likelihood that a business’s messages will reach a uniquely receptive 
audience. And because collecting users’ data has become cheap, easy, and lucrative, 
commercialized collection has become ubiquitous.59  
Additionally, users are becoming increasingly willing to share personal 
information. To take full advantage of the Internet of Things—the world in which 
our Internet-enabled devices facilitate the exchange of information—people must 
divulge information about themselves.60 The result is that data commoditization is 
relatively unrestrained and, predictably, consumers have reduced their privacy 
expectations.61 
To illustrate these problems, one need only consider Google, which came 
under international fire in 2013 for its questionable data collection practices. For 
years, specially outfitted Google cars have photographed buildings and streets to 
provide data that strengthens Google Maps. Problems began to arise, however, 
when Google also began collecting data about Wi-Fi hotspots, which it ultimately 
used to learn shockingly specific real-time information about its users’ locations. 
Google also obtained sensitive data—including sensitive medical information—
from unencrypted routers. Even though Google was sanctioned in numerous 
countries for its shady practices, its position in the geolocation services market was 
                                                          
57 Woodward & Bray, supra note 14.  
58 Lisa Madelon Campbell, Internet Intermediaries, Cloud Computing and Geospatial Data: How 
Competition and Privacy Converge in the Mobile Environment, 7 NO. 2 COMPETITION L. INT’L 60, 
62 (2011).  
59 Id. 
60 Hillary Brill & Scott Jones, Little Things and Big Challenges: Information Privacy and the 
Internet of Things, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1183, 1197 (2017). 
61 Madelon Campbell, supra note 58, at 62 (noting that “the plummeting cost of collecting, sharing 
and using personal data, and the utility of personal data as a financial underlay for many online 
services, are fundamentally transforming traditional notions of privacy”). 
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ultimately strengthened.62 What could possibly incentivize a business to safeguard 
its users’ privacy when there is no effective deterrent to unfettered data collection, 
especially when these businesses can experience significant financial windfall from 
their unauthorized data collection practices? As one scholar explained, “[T]here is 
little incentive for the design of systems which restrict collection of personal 
data.”63 
Even given businesses’ preferred practices and users’ concomitant limited 
expectations, users still recognize that they have some expectations of privacy, 
which must be protected. Users who rely on smartphones understand that their 
reliance comes with privacy tradeoffs. A Pew Research Center survey of 2,254 
adults revealed that because of privacy concerns, 19% of cell phone users disabled 
their phone’s tracking abilities.64 Furthermore, the survey indicated that 54% of the 
respondents declined to install at least one app, and 30% of users uninstalled an 
app, due to concerns about data collection practices.65 These numbers were 
consistent among both Android and iPhone users. So, clearly, privacy remains a 
concern to users despite their general recognition that they have less overall 
expectation of privacy. 
Despite users’ obvious concern, little has been done to protect their privacy, 
leading to the lament of some scholars.66 A few statutes, such as HIPAA and the 
Stored Communications Act (SCA)67, protect consumers from the unauthorized use 
of their data. However, these statutes do not address Copley’s business practices. 
Under the SCA, smartphones are not “facilities through which an electronic 
communication is provided,” and geolocation is not covered “content.”68 HIPAA, 
on the other hand, only governs the disclosure of information by certain healthcare 
providers, an umbrella listing that would not apply to Copley.69 Furthermore, no 
                                                          
62 Nathan Newman, Search, Antitrust, and the Economics of the Control of User Data. 31 YALE J. 
ON REG. 401, 435-437 (2014). 
63 Madelon Campbell, supra note 58, at 62. 
64 Jan Boyles, Aaron Smith, and Mary Madden, Privacy and Data Management on Mobile 
Devices, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, (Sept. 5, 2012), http://www.pewinternet.org/2012/09/05/ 
privacy-and-data-management-on-mobile-devices/ [https://perma.cc/7HY6-VNB9]. 
65 Id. at 2. 
66 See, e.g., Kevin F. King, Personal Jurisdiction, Internet Commerce, and Privacy: The Pervasive 
Legal Consequences of Modern Geolocation Technologies, 21 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 61, 115 
(2011); Matthew Whitten, Attacking Analogies: The Need for Independent Standards for Mobile 
Privacy, 19 U.C.L.A. J.L. & Tech. 1, 2 (2015). 
67 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (2017). 
68 In re iPhone Application Litigation, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
69 45 C.F.R. § 160.102(a) (2013) (HIPAA applies to the following entities: a health plan, a health 
care clearinghouse, or a health care provider “who transmits any health information in connection 
with a transaction covered by this subchapter.”). 
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current federal laws specifically regulate businesses’ use of geolocation 
technology. Several laws have been proposed to alleviate privacy concerns, 
including the Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011,70 the Application, 
Privacy, Protection and Security Act of 2013,71 and Illinois’ Geolocation Privacy 
Protection Act of 2017.72 Each one of these proposals has failed to become law. 
Two possible relevant avenues still provide protections for users’ privacy: 
FTC actions under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, and the privacy 
tort of intrusion. What follows is an evaluation of the applicability of each avenue, 
including the relative strengths and weaknesses of each potential remedy. 
 
A. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 
 
Copley’s practices were arguably “unfair and deceptive,” in violation of the 
Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act (MCPA).73 This act was intended to be 
“guided by the interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission and the 
Federal Courts to section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act…”74 Section 
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) uses similar language; it empowers 
the FTC to regulate a company’s “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”75 
Enforcement actions under section 5 provide guidance regarding the legality of 
Copley’s practices.76 These actions aim to protect consumers by ensuring that a 
business’s practices are honest and transparent.77 To this end, the FTC has 
repeatedly focused on promoting practices which protect users’ personally 
                                                          
70 Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011, S. 799, 112th Cong. (proposed April 12, 2011), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/senate-bill/799 [https://perma.cc/9GVW-U5MS]. 
71 Application, Privacy, Protection and Security Act of 2013, H.R. 1913, 113th Cong. (proposed 
May 9, 2013) (providing privacy guidelines for personal data collection, use and storage by 
mobile phone application developers) https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-
bill/1913 [https://perma.cc/3PXV-7ES4]. 
72 Illinois Geolocation Privacy Protection Act, H.B. 3449, 100th Gen. Assembly (proposed Feb. 10, 
2017), http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=3449&GAID=14&DocTypeID= 
HB&SessionID=91&GA=100 [https://perma.cc/46ME-2SV7]. 
73 M.G.L.A. 93A §2(a) (2017). 
74 M.G.L.A. 93A §2(b) (2017). 
75 15 U.S.C. §45 (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 52 (1994) 
76 The MCPA directs courts to look to the FTC and federal courts for guidance. M.G.L.A. 93A 
§2(b) (2017). 
77 See, e.g., Electronic Privacy Information Center, In re: Snapchat, EPIC.ORG (discussing a 
consent decree in which Snapchat admitted to storing messages on its servers despite leading users 
to believe that these messages were being deleted) 
http://epic.org/privacy/internet/ftc/snapchat/#response (last visited July 27, 2018). 
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identifiable information (PII), including information that directly identifies an 
individual, such as driver’s license information or social security numbers.78  
According to the FTC, geolocation information qualifies as protectable 
PII.79 Even though location information may not seem to be PII at first glance, it has 
the potential to be used in ways that violate a consumer’s expectations of privacy. 
Geolocation data can be used in a whole host of nefarious ways. It could “help build 
profiles about consumers without their knowledge or consent, or it could be 
accessed by cybercriminals, hackers or through surreptitious means such as 
‘stalking apps.’”80 Recognizing the dangers posed by these technologies, the FTC 
has used its section 5 enforcement authority in other relevant actions. For example, 
the FTC targeted an Android app provider that collected and transmitted users’ 
geolocation data to third-party advertisers without first obtaining the users’ 
consent81 and a software development kit provider that accessed and improperly 
used users’ geolocation information to deliver advertisements.82  
Under section 5, the FTC has typically required businesses that collect and 
use PII to give users sufficient notice of their data collection and usage activities, 
obtain users’ informed consent, and properly safeguard the privacy of collected 
information.83 The FTC’s notice requirements tend to be specific because absent 
adequate notice, a consumer cannot make informed decisions about whether to 
disclose certain information. In one case, for example, the FTC ordered an Android 
app provider to “prominently display[ ]” notice of the following on users’ phones: 
 
(1) That such application collects, transmits, or allows the 
                                                          
78 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, FTC STAFF REPORT: SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR 
ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING, 20 n. 47 (Feb. 2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/ 
files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-staff-report-self-regulatory-principles-online-
behavioral-advertising/p085400behavadreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7V4-Q34S]. 
79 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, FTC STAFF REPORT: PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN 
ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (Mar. 2012), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-
protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf . 
80 Schechner, supra note 8, at 188. 
81 Complaint at 2, Goldenshores Technologies (FTC 2013) (No. C-4446), https://www.ftc.gov/ 
sites/default/files/documents/cases/131205goldenshorescmpt.pdf (noting that users were informed 
that their data would be collected for updates and support, but not told that the data would be 
transmitted to third parties). 
82 Complaint at 3-6, United States v. InMobi Pte Ltd., (N.D. Cal.  2016) (No. 3:16-cv-3474). 
83 See generally Tomain, supra note 47, at 27-31 (discussing the FTC’s preference for opt-in 
policies). The Federal Communications Commission also issued a report discussing the 
importance of notice and transparency for companies using beacon technology. FEDERAL 
COMMC’NS COMM’N – WIRELESS TELECOMMS. BUREAU, LOCATION-BASED SERVICES: AN 
OVERVIEW OF OPPORTUNITIES AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS, at 19 (May 2012), 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/ DOC-314283A1.pdf. 
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transmission of geolocation information; (2) How geolocation 
information may be used; (3) Why such application is accessing 
geolocation information; and (4) The identity or specific categories 
of third parties that receive geolocation information directly or 
indirectly from such application.”84 
 
This notice adequately informs users about what type of data will be collected and 
how that data will be used and distributed. Requiring strong notice provisions helps 
cure the informational imbalance presented by the collection of information. 
Some companies have pushed back against stringent notice requirements, 
but transparency arguably benefits even them. Straightforward practices help 
eliminate “friction” in users’ decision-making because consumers are more likely 
to divulge personal information when they are assured that their data will be 
safeguarded.85 These practices not only safeguard users from informational 
imbalance; they promote an ethically sustainable way of reducing friction, which is 
key to the business practices outlined above. Thus, strong privacy protection 
practices can even be good for business. 
Some questions will inevitably arise with respect to privacy policies: At 
what point should notice be given? Should notice be opt-out or opt-in? And if notice 
is opt-in, would this yield any unique legal concerns? According to the FTC, 
companies should ideally provide users with notice just before collecting their 
geolocation data.86 This notice should also be opt-in; while opt-out policies may be 
preferred by companies, they tend to be ineffective in practice.87 Users frequently 
fail to exercise their rights and “opt-out” for a variety of reasons: they are given 
insufficient information about the policies; the policies are vague and broad; and/or 
the opt-out may be too limited and/or functionally inaccessible.88 And while opt-in 
policies may arguably compel corporate speech, they satisfy First Amendment 
principles if they are “reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing 
deception of consumers.”89 
                                                          
84 Decision and Order at 4, Goldenshores Technologies (FTC 2014) (No. C-4446), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140409goldenshoresdo.pdf. 
85 Schechner, supra note 8, at 181. 
86 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, FTC STAFF REPORT: MOBILE PRIVACY DISCLOSURES: BUILDING 
TRUST THROUGH TRANSPARENCY, at 15 (Feb. 2013), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/mobile-privacy-disclosures-building-
trust-through-transparency-federal-trade-commission-staff-report/130201mobileprivacyreport.pdf.  
87 See, e.g., Decision and Order at 2, Nomi Techs., Inc., (FTC 2015) (No. C-4538) (finding online 
opt-out policy was insufficient in part because it was unlikely that customers could easily access 
policy). 
88 Tomain, supra note 47, at 24-25. 
89 Id. at 52; Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 475 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
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In any event, FTC enforcement actions are useful because they provide 
administrative oversight of business practices. These actions ultimately help protect 
users because businesses will theoretically be compelled to incorporate stronger 
privacy protections into their policies. However, enforcement actions are 
inadequate because they do not help users realize immediate, individualized relief 
for the damages they have suffered due to a business’s unfair or deceptive practices. 
 
B. The Privacy Tort of Intrusion Upon Seclusion 
 
When users are damaged by a business’s intrusive practices, they can pursue 
relief through four different privacy torts: intrusion upon seclusion (“intrusion”), 
public disclosure of private facts, false light, and appropriation.90 Of these, intrusion 
is most directly applicable to the present issue because it involves how private 
information is obtained and used. The privacy tort of intrusion is defined as follows: 
“One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or 
seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the 
other for the invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person.”91 
The central issue here is whether using geolocation information to deliver 
targeted messages constitutes actionable intrusion. The answer, as evidenced in the 
“intrusion” definition above, requires the resolution of two questions: (1) does the 
individual have a reasonable expectation of privacy, and (2) was the intrusion 
“highly offensive to a reasonable person”?92  
The first question requires finding that the individual had an objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his geolocation data. As noted above in the 
discussion of FTC actions, there is reasonable ground to treat geolocation data as 
private given the sensitive nature of the information that can be extrapolated from 
it. The pertinent case law, however, is unsettled.  
In In re Vizio, Inc., Consumer Privacy Litigation,93 for example, the Central 
District of California held that the plaintiffs’ privacy claims were sufficient to 
survive a motion to dismiss.94 In that case, the plaintiffs successfully argued that 
Vizio improperly disclosed information about their “digital identities.”95 The 
information included the individuals’ MAC addresses, which uniquely identifies 
                                                          
90 William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
91 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
92 Id. at cmt. a. 
93 In re Vizio, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 3d 1204 (C.D. Cal. 2017). 
94 Id. at 1211. 
95 Id. at 1225. 
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users’ electronic devices and “can be used to acquire highly specific geolocation 
data.”96 However, the court was also motivated by the plaintiffs’ assertion that 
MAC addresses could “allegedly identify a person when combined with Vizio’s 
disclosure of consumers’ IP addresses, zip codes, product model numbers, 
hardware and software versions, chipset IDs, and region and language settings.”97 
It is, therefore, difficult to judge how much the court’s analysis hinged on the 
privacy concerns of geolocation data. 
Other case law in California (mostly unpublished decisions in the Northern 
District of California) provides ammunition to argue that geolocation data should 
not be deemed private. In In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litigation,98 the court 
considered the privacy implications where Google aggregated user data among its 
products and divulged this information to third parties.99 In dicta, the court said, 
“Courts in this district have consistently refused to characterize the disclosure of 
common, basic digital information to third parties as serious or egregious violations 
of social norms.”100 Similarly, the court declined to find an actionable privacy 
invasion under the California Constitution where users’ browsing histories were 
disclosed without authorization to third-party advertisers.101 The disclosure, which 
included users’ LinkedIn IDs and URLs they visited, did not constitute a “highly 
offensive disclosure of information” as required by California law.102 
While the privacy status of geolocation data is, at best, open to question, 
language in one unpublished California decision provides some guidance for what 
behaviors could be construed as actionable. In Yunker v. Pandora Media, Inc.,103 
the court said that more egregious electronic tracking could support an invasion of 
privacy claim.104 The court referred to Goodman v. HTC in support of its decision.105 
In that case, HTC allegedly installed codes on users’ phones that could “track their 
movements, including where they live, work, dine and shop.”106 This information 
                                                          
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litig., 58 F. Supp. 3d 968 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
99 Id. at 974. 
100 Id. at 985. 
101 Low v. LinkedIn Corp., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2012).  
102 Id. 
103 Yunker v. Pandora Media, Inc., No. 11-CV-02113 JSW, 2013 WL 1282980 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 
26, 2013). 
104 Id. at *14-15. 
105 Id. 
106 Goodman v. HTC Am., Inc., No. C11-1793MJP, 2012 WL 2412070, *1 (W.D. Wash. June 26, 
2012). 
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was compiled into a dossier and sold without authorization.107 This suggests that 
behavior, if egregious enough, could violate privacy expectations. 
Unfortunately, the most factually similar case provides scant guidance for 
the Copley issue because it was resolved on technical standing grounds. In re 
iPhone Application Litigation108 involved claims that Apple wrongly exchanged 
geolocation information with its servers even when users turned off location 
services on their iPhones.109 The plaintiffs sued under two California statutes: the 
Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) and the Unfair Competition Law (UCL).110 
To prevail on these claims, the plaintiffs were required to demonstrate that they 
detrimentally relied on Apple’s misrepresentation(s), but they failed to show any 
actual reliance.111 Although the plaintiffs clicked to consent to Apple’s privacy 
policies, this action alone could not satisfy the reliance element. To prove reliance, 
the plaintiffs would have to show some affirmative action, such as actually reading 
the relevant policy.112 The “click” alone was insufficient; because there was no 
reliance, the plaintiffs’ claims failed. 
Because scant law exists, and what exists is contradictory, it is unfortunately 
unclear whether geolocation data would be deemed private. The second question—
whether using geolocation data to deliver targeted messages would be “highly 
offensive to a reasonable person”—is even trickier to predict. In Opperman v. Path, 
Inc.,113 the court said that whether an invasion was “highly offensive” would depend 
on such things as “the degree of intrusion, the context, conduct and circumstances 
surrounding the intrusion as well as the intruder’s motives and objectives, the 
setting into which he intrudes, and the expectations of those whose privacy is 
invaded.”114 The offensiveness inquiry hinges on the facts of each case.115 
Attempting to apply this nebulous standard to Copley’s situation is difficult. What 
makes Copley’s case more persuasive, however, is that even if a court determined 
that the use of geolocation technology itself presents no actionable intrusion, 
Copley traded on users’ sensitive medical information. The unique privacy 
concerns attached to the unauthorized use of that information may very well be 
deemed “highly offensive,” and therefore actionable. 
                                                          
107 Id. 
108 In re iPhone Application Litigation, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
109 Id. at 1008-1009. 
110 Id. at 1007. 
111 Id. at 1012. 
112 Id. at 1025. 
113 Opperman v. Path, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 3d 1064 (N.D. Cal. 2016). 
114 Id. at 1077. 
115 Id. at 1078. 
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There is, indeed, something off-putting about the idea of Copley using 
geofencing technology to obtain users’ sensitive information and target their 
smartphones with judgmental messages. These messages were intended for a 
vulnerable population—women seeking medical guidance regarding the 
termination of pregnancy—at their most vulnerable time: when they were in close 
proximity to their medical providers. Such behavior arguably violates “community 
norms of privacy,” which would strongly suggest that the actions are “highly 
offensive.”116 This question ultimately cannot be resolved, however, unless it is 
determined that the transmission of user data effectuated something more than de 
minimis injury. 
The problem with relying on the privacy tort of intrusion is that relief is 
inconsistent and case law is contradictory. It is unclear how any particular court 
would evaluate the intrusiveness of business practices like Copley’s. This makes it 
difficult to determine what reasonable privacy expectations should look like and 
how the law should operate to protect them. 
 
III. PROTECTING USERS’ PRIVACY THROUGH A NEW FEDERAL STATUTE 
As discussed above, both FTC actions and the intrusion tort are insufficient to 
safeguard users’ privacy expectations fully. Ideally, a federal privacy statute that 
clearly delineated the practices for collecting, using and transmitting geolocation 
information would also protect users. With respect to the concerns of mobile 
privacy issues, one scholar argued, “A strong legislative response is necessary to 
help combat the threats to privacy that exist, and legislation at the national level 
would be the most effective means of enacting such reform.”117 
 
A. Proposed Laws and Industry Guidelines 
 
A proposed Illinois law, the Geolocation Privacy Protection Act (GLPA),118 
actually created clear guidelines for geolocation data that could be adapted for a 
federal statute. The GLPA said that businesses could not: 
 
collect, use, store, or disclose geolocation information from a 
location-based application on a person’s device unless the private 
                                                          
116 Id. at 1079. 
117 Whitten, supra note 66, at 24. 
118 H.B. 3449, 100th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill., 2017), http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ 
BillStatus.asp?DocNum=3449&GAID=14&DocTypeID=HB&SessionID=91&GA=100. 
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entity first receives the person’s affirmative express consent after 
complying with the specified notice requirements.119 
 
The GLPA also would have provided impacted users the greater of liquidated or 
actual damages, as well as attorney’s costs and injunctive relief.120 This bill, 
however, was vetoed by Illinois Governor Bruce Rauner, who said it “would result 
in job loss across the state without materially improving privacy protections for 
Illinoisans or making devices and their apps safer for children.”121 Privacy 
advocates and trade associations decried the veto, noting that the bill actually 
reflected existing FTC guidelines. 
Despite Rauner’s veto, the Illinois law nevertheless provides a reasonable 
starting point to craft a federal statute. In addition, guidance for constructing a 
statute can be derived from the best practices adopted by various trade associations, 
including CTIA, a trade association representing the wireless communications 
industry, and the Digital Advertising Alliance (DAA), which establishes privacy 
practices for digital advertising. 
The CTIA established guidelines to “promote and protect user privacy as 
new and exciting Location-Based Services (“LBS”) are developed and 
deployed.”122 They also suggest protecting users’ information through seven other 
safeguards, including compliance with “applicable laws” and retention 
limitations.123 Similarly, the DAA established privacy guidelines that “apply to 
certain types of data in the Mobile web site and application development.”124 These 
policies are particularly relevant because they acknowledge the more modern 
privacy concerns of the mobile environment. The DAA’s policies, similar to those 
put forth by the CTIA, also focus on notice and consent, though it includes stronger 
guidance for data transmitted to third parties. It also has specific guidelines for 
safeguarding sensitive information, including health data. 
 
 
 
B. What Elements Should a Federal Statute Include? 
                                                          
119 Id. at para 1. 
120 Id. 
121 Robert Channick, Rauner Vetoes Geolocation Privacy Bill Aimed at Protecting Smartphone 
Users, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Sept. 22, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-
geolocation-privacy-rauner-veto-20170922-story.html. 
122 CTIA, BEST PRACTICES AND GUIDELINES FOR LOCATION BASED SERVICES (2010), 
https://www.ctia.org/the-wireless-industry/industry-commitments/best-practices-and-guidelines-
for-location-based-services. 
123 Id. 
124 Digital Advertising Alliance, Application of Self-Regulatory Principles to the Mobile 
Environment, 1 (July 2013), http://www.aboutads.info/DAA_Mobile_Guidance.pdf. 
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This section of the article draws upon the GLPA, as well as CTIA and DAA 
guidelines, to highlight key elements that should be incorporated into a federal 
geolocation privacy statute. The bulk of this information can be broken down into 
six broad elements that must be included in order to adequately protect users’ 
privacy. These provisions help maximize the potential for users to be fully informed 
before consenting to a business’s data practices. They are also simple so businesses 
can easily adhere to them. Ideally, businesses will also realize increased user 
confidence due to the transparency of their privacy practices. 
 
1. Businesses must provide adequate notice to consumers regarding 
how their data is collected, used, and transmitted to third parties. 
 
The utility of a geolocation privacy statute turns on adequate consumer 
notice. Primarily, the privacy statute must direct businesses to provide ample notice 
to users about how their information will be obtained, used, and shared. The 
purpose of notice is to provide users with sufficient information to make informed 
decisions about whether to consent to a business’s data practices. Requiring 
sufficient notice will serve to correct the informational imbalance and enable users 
to control whether and how their information can be manipulated. 
The notice must indicate exactly what information will be collected, 
whether that data includes any PII, how the data will be used, with whom the 
information will be shared, how the information will be stored, and for how long 
the information will be retained. 
2. Businesses must give adequate notice to consumers regarding how 
third parties will use their data. 
 
Business policies regarding the transmission of data to third parties must be 
specifically outlined for the user. Here, the informational imbalance is most 
pronounced. The user has entered into an agreement with a business; however, this 
user’s data is now being transmitted to third parties with whom the user never 
communicated directly. Therefore, users must be notified of (1) the identities of the 
third parties collecting and using their information, and (2) how these third parties 
are using that information. 
Including information about third-party data use in a generalized notice 
policy is insufficient to give users the opportunity to meaningfully consent to the 
use of their data. This information should be conveyed in a way that is meaningful 
to consumers. 
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Another element important here is that businesses should be required to 
obtain individualized consent for each third party to whom data will be transmitted. 
Obtaining blanket consent is insufficient here. 
 
3. Businesses must give adequate notice to consumers regarding data 
retention policies. 
 
Businesses must inform users of how their data is being stored and 
safeguarded. Data should only be retained as long as necessary, depending on 
business needs. If a business intends to store information for any significant length 
of time, it must anonymize the data to the extent practicable. When the information 
is no longer central to the business’s needs, it must be destroyed. 
 
4. Businesses must provide periodic updates reiterating their data 
policies and convey information about any policy changes to 
consumers promptly. 
 
Businesses should periodically provide users updates reiterating their data 
policies. If a business alters its data practices, it must convey these changes to the 
user promptly.  
These requirements together enable the user to evaluate the business’s 
practices and determine whether to provide consent. The provisions both correct 
informational imbalance and empower the user to determine whether and how his 
information is used. 
 
5. Businesses must provide periodic updates reiterating their data 
policies. 
 
Users should also be given periodic updates that reiterate the business’s data 
policies. This enables users to reassess their consent and encourages mutually 
beneficial practices to be sustained. 
 
6. All notice must be “clear, meaningful, and prominent.” 
 
The various guidelines set forth in the trade publications do not indicate a 
preference for format. CTIA simply says that “[p]roviders may use written, 
electronic or oral notice so long as users have an opportunity to be fully informed 
of … information practices.”125 Similarly, the DAA directs businesses to provide 
                                                          
125 CTIA, supra note 122, at section 4. 
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notice in a form “where such notice is clear, meaningful, and prominent.”126 Again, 
although the notice formatting requirements are deliberately left up to a broad 
interpretation, it seems clear that the most “clear, meaningful, and prominent” form 
of notice when a business is using geolocation data would be delivered 
electronically to the user. This notice does not need to be a push notification—
although that would maximize the clarity, meaningfulness and prominence of the 
notice—but it should at least be a prominent piece of the user agreement. Notice, 
however, cannot be buried in the terms of service agreement. As part of the 
agreement, users should be given a separate prompt covering data use and 
transmission. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Copley’s messages were, on their face, protected political speech under the 
First Amendment. However, reasonable content-neutral restrictions can still apply 
to regulate Copley’s speech, even considering Supreme Court case law protecting 
speech near abortion clinics. Healey’s actions, as evidenced in the Assurance of 
Discontinuance,127 focused on neutral concerns, specifically Copley’s unauthorized 
use of geolocation data to customize messages to reach a particular group of 
consumers: vulnerable “abortion-minded” women near medical providers. 
Existing mechanisms that arguably target Copley’s behavior are FTC 
section 5 enforcement actions and the common-law privacy tort of intrusion. The 
former is robust, but aggrieved users will not realize immediate, individualized 
relief, and it is unclear whether the unauthorized collection and/or transmission of 
geolocation data alone can support a cause of action under the latter. 
This study ultimately suggests that users’ privacy expectations would be 
best protected by delineating clear business practices regarding the collection, use, 
and transmission of geolocation information. The policy should include: strong, 
clear notice provisions with periodic updates provided to users; statements 
regarding the transmission of data to, and use by, third parties; revocable opt-in 
consent for the use of individuals’ information; provision regarding changes to data 
use; a statement about the collection, use or distribution of sensitive (non-
geolocation) data, including medical information; and a strong data retention and 
destruction policy. 
                                                          
126 Digital Advertising Alliance, supra note 124, at 13. 
127 Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 2, at 3. 
